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A well-known axiom of Family Law is that following parental separa- 
tion the children of the relationship generally need a continuing, close 
contact with both parents in order to ensure their good psychological 
health.' Accordingly, when one parent has sole custody of the child, good 
and frequent access to the other parent is normally seen as being of vital 
importance. However in an era of increased mobility, attributable in part 
to the quest for employment opportunities, it is not uncommon for the 
custodial parent to seek to move towns or countries. In such situations a 
Court is confronted with the difficult task of determining whether the 
benefits of access are so compelling in the particular case that the wish of 
the custodial parent to move must be denied. 
In New Zealand, as in Australia, Canada, and England, issues on custody 
and access are controlled by the paramountcy principle, albeit in slightly 
differing forms, and any decision is inevitably particularised and depend- 
ent on its own facts. Nonetheless, a study of the cases from the various 
jurisdictions does reveal the emergence of some general trends and prin- 
ciples, and this article aims to isolate and analyse those trends. 
The position in New Zealand 
The freedom of the custodial parent to move residence within New 
Zealand has been discussed on two occasions by the Court of Appeal. In 
the first case, Wright v Wright,2 the essential question for the Court was 
whether a condition placed on a custody order in favour of the mother (as 
to continued residence in Wellington) had been made pursuant to s. 13 of 
the Guardianship Act 1968. That section deals with disputes between 
guardians, and does not allow for any right of appeal from the Family 
Court. In this particular case, the Family Court had ruled that if the mother 
were to move to Auckland, as she desired, then custody should revert to 
the father. On these facts, the Court of Appeal held that the question of 
residence was very closely linked to the question of custody and access, 
and that the matter of residence could not therefore have been dealt with 
under s. 13 alone. In the course of their joint judgment in the Court of 
Appeal Cooke and Richardson JJ declared: 
... since custody is defined as the 'rightto possession and care of achild' an order for sole custody, 
without qualification, carries with it the prima facie right to determine the child's place of 
residence. The same must follow from anunqualified agreement that one party is to have custody. 
... Wlnless restricted bv statutorv vrovision or Court order or aereement the person entitled to 
custohy must have reasonable frkidom to select the child's of residenk3 
I For instance, in their longitudinal study of children who had experienced separation, Wallerstein 
and Blakeslee concluded Fat "[als in the intact family, the child's continued relationship with 
parents who co-operate with each other remains vital to his or her proper development": Second 
Chances (Bantam Press, 1989), 316. The psychological benefits for the child of good, frequent 
access have also been recently highlighted by Lee, Shaughnessy and Bankes, "Impact of Expedited 
Visitation Services: A Court programme that enforces access through the eyes of children" (1995) 
33 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 495. 
2 [I9841 1 NZLR 366. 
3 Ibid,at371. 
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The Court of Appeal proceeded to note, however, that restrictions on 
residence were common, and drew attention to the possible infringement 
of access rights, either ordered or agreed, if there were "significant 
changes" of the child's residence without consent of the access parent or 
a Court order. 
In the more recent second case, Stadniczenko v Stadniczenko,4 the 
custodial mother was applying for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal 
against a condition placed on a custody order by the High Court, following 
an appeal by the father from a Family Court decision allowing the mother 
to move with the children from Wellington to Auckland. On appeal, the 
High Court imposed the condition that the children were not to be removed 
from Wellington without the consent of the father or of the Court. As, 
pursuant to s. 3 l(4) of the Guardianship Act 1968, an appeal to the Court 
of Appeal from the High Court was only possible, with leave, on questions 
of law, the mother sought to argue that the High Court Judge had errone- 
ously added the condition as to residence in order to assure the father of 
access, when there had be no disagreement as to the father's entitlement 
to access. 
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that Doogue J in the High Court had 
reached his decision on the basis of the welfare of the children, as required 
by the paramountcy principle of s. 23 of the Guardianship Act 1968. On 
Doogue J's view ofthe facts ofthe case, the children's needs included their 
need for a continuing relationship with the father; and the Court of Appeal 
held that an error of law had not been made. However, in an obiter dicta 
pronouncement, however, McKay J, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
stated: 
[i]f the Judge had imposed the condition as to residence solely in order to give recognition 
to Mr Stadniczenko's rights of access, and had failed to give proper weight to the rights of 
Mrs Stadniczenko as custodial parent to pursue her own life as seemed best to her, then the 
Judge could be said to have made an error of law (at 500). 
It is interesting that in both Court of Appeal judgments there is such 
emphasis on so-called "rights", because the paramountcy principle, which 
Mckay J acknowledged in Stadniczenko v Stadniczenko overrode any 
parental "rights", would seem to deprive the right of any core or substance; 
and it is quite exceptional for the Courts to concede the existence of any 
parental rights in the context of custody or access disputes. On the other 
hand, it will be shortly be seen that the paramountcy principle provides 
only illusory assistance in this context, as often the alternative options 
presented to the Court by the parents are likely to diminish rather than 
enhance the child's welfare. Further, it will soon become apparent that the 
Courts usually accede to the custodial parent's desire to move, to such an 
extent that the custodial parent has a freedom to relocate which must come 
close to approximating a "right". Conversely, it has been held in Wright v 
Wright that the non-custodial parent's claim to access, whether court-ordered 
or agreed between the parties, does constitute an obstacle to the custodial 
parent being at liberty to move without Court order or mutual consent. If 
correct, then, to that limited extent, the non-custodial parent's claim might 
also be loosely described as a "right". 
4 [I9951 NZFLR 493. 
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Where the access is Court-ordered, then the constraints on the custodial 
parent's freedom to move are, as observed by the Court ofAppeal in Wright 
v Wright, reinforced by statutory provisions contained in ss. 20A and 20(3) 
of the Guardianship Act 1968. Section 20A creates an offence where any 
person "without reasonable excuse" and "with intent to prevent an order 
for access to a child being complied with hinders or prevents access to a 
child by a person who is entitled under the order to access to the child". In 
order to circumvent the section, a custodial parent might seek to argue that 
a move to another city or country was reasonably justifiable, having been 
motivated, for example,, not by any intent to hinder access but by reason 
of economic opportunity. A move so motivated would arguably not require 
any prior application to the Court. Nevertheless, 20A is a statutory re- 
minder of the constraints placed on a custodial parent once an access order 
is made, though the section has no application where access is agreed rather 
than ordered. 
Additionally, where an access order has been made, and is in force, then 
s. 20(3) of the Guardianship Act 1968 also has effect. This section creates 
an offence, punishable by imprisonment up to 3 months, where any person, 
without leave of the Court, takes or attempts to take any child out of New 
Zealand, knowing that an access order in favour of any other person is in 
force, or that proceedings are pending. The Court of Appeal observed that 
the wide terms of the section had "understandably" led commentators to 
point out the desirability of seeking leave of the C ~ u r t . ~  Further, if a 
proposed move is outside New Zealand, then there could be a possible 
breach of the other party's own "rights of custody" under Article 5 of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (defined, 
interestingly, to include the right to determine a child's place ofresidence), 
and the provisions of the Convention become highly relevant. 
Once proceedings seeking leave to move are in train, then the paramoun- 
tcy principle of s. 23(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968 is operational; and 
by s. 23(2) of the Act the Court is also thereupon required to ascertain the 
wishes of the child, and to take account of those wishes as it thinks fit, 
having regard to the child's age and maturity. Those requirements, of 
course, are basic to any custody or access issue. In this context, however, 
they can be peculiarly difficult to apply. 
The child's welfare 
It will be seen that the Courts frequently determine the custodial parent's 
application on the basis of its "reasonableness". The reasonableness or 
otherwise of the application could, of course, be measured against the 
child's welfare, and thereby be neatly fitted within the paramountcy 
pr in~iple .~  In practice, though, reasonableness is most often examined in 
terms ofthe custodial parent's emotional or employment needs. Ifthe move 
is adjudged reasonable in terms of those needs, it is then, but often only 
then, that the Court comes to weigh the child's welfare by asking whether 
the otherwise reasonable move might have deleterious effects for the child. 
In other words, the test for the Court is usually not whether the move will 
s Note 2, at 372. 
6 See, for instance, the discussion of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in the leading 
decision Holmes v Holmes (1988) FLC 91-918. 
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positively benefit the child's welfare, but rather whether it can be demon- 
strated that a move which is reasonable for the custodial parent to make 
might be harmful to the child's interests. For instance Nourse LJ summed 
up the English authorities on this issue by concluding that "... if the 
proposal ofthe custodial parent to move with the children ... is areasonable 
one, leave should only be refused if it is clearly shown that the move would 
be against the interests of the ~ h i l d . " ~  This reflects a much more parent-fo- 
cused approach than that normally pertaining in custody and access dis- 
putes. 
There are dicta from the New Zealand Family Court which suggest that 
a decision will be unreasonable where "the benefits of a new residence are 
not dem~nstrable";~ but those benefits usually can be demonstrated where 
the custodial parent is likely to be become embittered and resentful if he 
or she is rehsed permission to move. In such cases, the stress and tension 
generated by an adverse judicial decision could well impact adversely on 
the child. The risk is particularly apparent if the custodial parent should 
suffer from a depressive i l l n e s ~ , ~  but this so-called "distress factor" applies 
more generally.1° Noting what he described as "the almost inevitable 
bitterness" which would follow the Court's interference with what was, 
from the custodial parent's point of view, a "reasonable" decision, Ormrod 
LJ declared that the Court should not do something which in ordinary 
human terms was prima facie "unreasonable" "... unless there is some 
compelling reason to the contrary".ll 
Paradoxically, custodial parents who feel able to adopt a selfless attitude, 
and announce themselves ready to sacrifice their own goals and plans for 
the children's sake, are to some extent penalised- they might be perceived 
to be more immune to the bitterness and resentment normally ensuing from 
a judicial decision disallowing the planned move. For instance, in Stad- 
niczenko v Stadniczenko the mother's genuine concern for the children's 
welfare, reflected in her stated preference, if need be, to stay in Wellington 
with the children rather than to move to Auckland to her family and male 
friend, was a factor in the High Court Judge's decision to refuse permission 
to move. Similarly, the English Court of Appeal upheld a decision declin- 
ing the custodial mother's application to emigrate with the children to 
Australia, having noted the views ofthe first instance Judge that the mother 
put her children first. It was felt by the Judge that although an adverse 
decision would result in disappointment and frustration for the mother, she 
would not allow it to destroy the children's relationship with either herself 
or the father. Judge Hutchinson, quoting the mother's own evidence that 
she would 'survive', was satisfied that she could cope with the decision 
7 M v  M [I9921 2 FLR 303, at 308. 
8 C V  C TI9951 NZFLR 360, at 368. 
9 As in C v c,-ibid. 
10 See, eg McDowaN v McDowall [I9951 NZFLR 163, 165 per Judge O'Donovan, and Reeves v 
Reeves (District Court, Dunedin, FP 012/190/92, 18 June 1993, Judge Kean) 39; in Australia see 
Fragomeli v Fragomeli (1993) FLC 92-393, 80,023, and more recently In the marriage of I and1 
(1995) FLC 92-603,82,029; in England see the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chamberlain 
v de la Mare (1983) 4 FLR 434, 443, Lonslow v Hennig [I9861 2 FLR 378, and Re F (a Ward) 
[I9881 2 FLR 116. There is support for this view in Wallerstein and Blakeslee's celebrated study 
Second Chances, note 1, at 317: the authors contend that where children live with their mother 
after divorce "the single most protective factor in a child's psychological development and 
well-being over the years is the mother's mental health and the quality of her parenting." 
11 Chamberlain v de la Mare, ibid. 
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refusing her permission to move.12 On the other hand, such expressions of 
unselfishness on the part of the custodial parent are not invariably harmful 
to the parent's application: they may be regarded as symptomatic of the 
positive parenting attributes of the custodial parent, thereby bolstering the 
strength of the application.13 
Certainly the Courts normally incline to the view that if the desire to 
move is reasonably motivated from the custodial parent's point of view, 
then any distress caused to that parent by the frustration of that move is 
correspondingly reasonable. Where there is a new family unit, and it is 
perhaps the new partner who seeks to move, then the Courts are concerned 
that any stress and resentment, particularly emanating from the new 
partner, could lead to a fracture of that new family unit. There are conse- 
quently a number of decisions in which the Courts have stressed the 
importance of promoting the stability and happiness of the new family.14 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal, for instance, reasoned that as society 
permits and even encourages remarriage, a new family unit must be 
allowed to live a normal family life once a second stable union had been 
formed.15 
Where there is no new family unit and it is the custodial parent alone 
who seeks to move, then it is often simply assumed that what is good for 
the custodial parent is good for the child.16 This is the philosophy which 
led Judge Frater to conclude in Bachler v Parker17 that "generally the 
child's interests are served by allowing their custodial parent to get on with 
the ordinary business of living even if that involves a move overseas."18 
In a recent judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that not only are 
the best interests of the child and custodial parent "inextricably tied to those 
of the child",19 but that in any event the Court should be "overwhelmingly 
respectful of the decision-making capacity" of the person in whom custody 
has been vested.20 In a judgment which evidences considerable sympathy 
for the exacting nature of day-to-day parenting demands, the Court of 
Appeal asserted that the Court should be reluctant to interpose itself 
between the child and the parent, given that the consequences of one-off 
judgment of the Court delivered on a particular day must be endured on a 
continuing basis by the parent responsible for physical care for the child, 
whereas the access parent, as the Court observed, normally bears far fewer 
of the responsibilities. 
The human sensitivity and the recognition of parenting burdens dis- 
played in that judgment may well prove persuasive to other Courts. Yet, 
12 Tyler v Tyler [I9891 2 FLR 158. 
13 See eg P (LM) v P (GE), [I9701 3 All ER 659, at 600 per Winn LJ, and at 663 per Sachs U ;  see 
also Fman v Fman (1991) 32 RFL (3d) 121 at 132. This is redolent of Solomonic wisdom: see I 
Kings 4: 16-28. 
14 See eg Belton v Belton [I9871 2 FLR 343, at 346 per Purchas LJ; Chamberlain v de la Mare note 
10, at 445 per Griffiths U ;  and Lonslow v Hennig, note 10. 
15 Koipesho v Korpesho (1982) 3 1 RFL (2d) 449, at 45 1 per Monnin JA. See also the comment by 
the Family Court of Australia in Fragomeli v Fragomeli (1993) FLC 92-393 that one of the main 
objects of the Family Law Act 1975 was to enable the parties to a broken marriage to make a new 
life for themselves. The tolerance towards aplanned move may be lessened if there is not perceived 
to be a firm commitment to the new relationship: Brigante v Brigante (1991) 32 RFL (3d) 299. 
16 Re F (a Ward), note 10, at 121-122 per Kerr LJ. 
17 (Family Court, FP 432/92,23 December 1993). 
18 Ibid, at 17. 
19 MacGiver v Richards, (1995 Ont. C.A. Lexis 106, March 23 1995), at 21. 
20 Ibid, at 20. 
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the judgment is a particularly striking indicator of the extent to which 
decision-making in this area of custody law has become adult-oriented 
rather than child-centred. After all, it is generally acknowledged that 
children, on the whole, thrive under conditions of stability, continuity, and 
routine; and it is known that change for children, particularly the very 
young, can be quite traumatic. Only rarely, though, is that trauma acknow- 
ledged,21 and only rarely is the welfare of the child held to be better served 
by retaining the known for what is inevitably unknown.22 More typical is 
the robustness shown by Treyvaud J in the Family Court of Australia when 
he pronounced that life must be accepted as "an ever changing prospect",23 
and that changes of environment were inevitable in life. That may be adult 
realism, but it is not seeing the world through the eyes of a child. 
It is difficult to gainsay the force of the argument in favour of custodial 
parent's freedom to move, but it does need to be clearly recognised that 
the paramountcy principle is being severely qualified, if not entirely 
subsumed, by that freedom. Put simply, the welfare ofmany children often 
requires a good, frequent relationship with the access parent,24 and a move 
away from that parent is a move that does not enhance their welfare. 
Sometimes Judges do concede this. For instance, in one Canadian decision 
Blair J expressly acknowledged that in mobility cases there was often no 
way to avoid likely adverse effects for the children, and that it was therefore 
"anomalous" in these cases to speak of the best interests ofthose children.25 
Having made that acknowledgment, Blair J allowed the custodial mother 
to move overseas. 
In many cases, then, it needs to be openly conceded that judicial 
authorisation for the move is hardly in the child's best interests, but is 
nevertheless the least detrimental alternative for the children. As Judge 
Green observed extra-judicially, "... the Judge with the best will in the 
world, is more often than not faced with what is for the child a 'lose-lose' 
~ i tua t ion . "~~  In New Zealand, judicial genuflection to the paramountcy 
principle is dictated by s. 23 of the Guardianship Act 1968; but the real 
task of the Court in mobility cases, as McGechan J once opined, is more 
"a matter of choosing the course least damaging to the children".27 
The wishes of the child 
The general difficulties involved in first ascertaining and then determin- 
ing what weight should be given to a child's views in custody disputes are 
~ e l l - k n o w n . ~ ~  For instance, apart from the statutory requirement to pay 
For example, the trauma of change for young children aged seven and five was influential in the 
decision of the High Court Judge to require the custodial parent not to move in Stadniczenko v 
Stadniczenko, note 4, at 501. 
But see eg Hedley v Hedley FLN [34] per Judge Maxwell. 
Lourie and Peristein (1993) FLC 92-405, at 80, 155. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed that the High Court Judge in Stadniczenko v Stadniczenko, note 
4, had made no error of law because his decision was reached on the basis of the welfare of the 
children " ... looking at all relevant factors including the need of the particular children for a 
continuing relationship with their father" (at 500). 
Oldfieldv Oldfield (1991) 33 RFL (3d) 235, at 237. 
"Custodv and Access - Parents at a distance: Intractable access". in Familv Law Conference 
Papers ;ol I (New Zealand Law Society, 1995), 138 
Burke v Rahzm (High Court, Wellington, AP 302 and 330192, 25 May 1993) at 31 In Bachler v 
Parker, note 17, Judge Frater allowed the move to Australia on the basis that there was no 
"sign$cant risk of dahger" to the child (emphasis added, at 17). 
See the discussion in Family Law in New Zealand (6th ed, Buttenvorths, 1993) at 352-354. 
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heed to the children's age and maturity there is always the underlying 
concern, when evaluating the significance of a child's wishes, that the 
expressed wishes may differ fiom his or her true, underlying wishes. On 
the issue of residence, conscious or unconscious indoctrination from a 
parent is not unc0mmon,2~ and sometimes children are simply in emotional 
turmoil following the aftermath of their parents' separation, and are in no 
state to formulate rationally-based views. In Parmenter v Batt30 Thorp J 
concluded that the strongly expressed opposition ofthe two sons, aged nine 
and eleven, to the proposed move, which had proved influential in the 
Family Court's decision, to refuse the custodial parent's application, was 
"... in considerable measure a reflection of their being increasin ly in- 
volved in their parents' conflict rather than a considered choice".lk~imi- 
larly, in Wright v Wright, Cooke J and Richardson J noted that Counsel for 
the Child had explained that the seven-year-old boy tended to accept the 
view ofthe parent he was with at the time: he wished both to go to Auckland 
with his mother, and to remain with his father in Wellington. The Court of 
Appeal found that any further exploration of the wishes of this boy was 
unlikely to be helpful. 
The difficulty in ascertaining the wishes ofthe child can be compounded 
if there is an overt difference of opinion between professional psycholo- 
gists. For instance, in Greer v Greel-32 the psychologist, appointed by the 
Court pursuant to s. 29A of the Guardianship Act 1968, contended that 
there was a divergence between a ten-year-old's strongly expressed wish 
to emigrate to Israel with his mother, and his deep wish to have a developed 
relationship with both parents. The boy's expressed wish, so the s. 29A 
reporter held, was essentially the absorption of his mother's view. The 
mother sought an opinion from a different psychologist. This latter psy- 
chologist suggested that the boy's desire to return to Israel was based 
primarily on his own experience and love of Israel, and only secondarily 
on the influence of his mother. This difference of professional opinion was 
eventually resolved by an interview of the boy by the Family Court Judge, 
who, detecting some uncertainty on the part of the boy as to the timing of 
the move, ultimately declined the mother's application to leave. 
Even where the wishes of the child are unambiguous, rational, and 
uninfluenced by others, it is apparent that they usually prove to have little 
impact in dictating or altering the residential plans of a parent who has been 
selected by the Court to be the custodial parent. Once custody has been 
allocated it seems the Courts are reluctant to intervene in the parent-child 
disagreement by favouring the wishes of the child over the wishes of the 
responsible parent - though a child's wish not to move might prove 
influential in the Court's initial decision to grant custody to the other 
parent.33 
29 See the English Court of Appeal decision in Mv M, note 7. 
30 (1994) 13FRNZ51. 
31 Ibid, at 55. His Honour also concluded that in any event their ages pointed against their wishes 
being determinative. 
3 2  [I9951 NZFLR 176. 
33 See the discussion of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in In the marriage ofRyan 
andRyan (1976) FLC 90-144,75,704 - 75,705. 
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The "rights" or freedom of the custodial parent 
There are clearly some differences in judicial approach between the 
cases where there are competing proposals for custody and cases where a 
long term or unchallenged custodial parent seeks the particular authorisa- 
tion to move.34 In cases where there are competing claims for custody, then 
the impact on a child of the new environment proposed by one of the 
parents can be relevant in the Court's determination as to which of the two 
parenting proposals would best promote the child's welfare. Most particu- 
larly, if both parents would seem to present as suitable custodial parents, 
then a proposal on the part of one of them to move from the established 
environment, may persuade the Court that the other parent would be the 
more desirable custodian.35 In such circumstances, a condition as to 
residence imposed on a parent seeking to move is less draconian in its 
effects: the parent is only required to stay in a particular place if he or she 
is prepared in the h r e  to accept the task of caring for the child. 
In many cases on residence, however, the question of responsibility for 
primary custody is not in dispute,36 and where one parent has long been 
the custodial parent, and the custody arrangements have been working 
satisfactorily, then different considerations must come into play. Here, the 
Courts tend to assert that the custodial parent, once chosen, should be free 
to decide where she or he lives. This is seen, for instance, in the Court of 
Appeal judgment of Wright v Wright where Cooke and Richardson JJ 
stated that: 
since custody is defined as "the right to possession and care of a child" an order for sole 
custody, without qualification, carries with it the prima facie right to determine the child's 
place of residence. The same must follow from an unqualified agreement that that one party 
is to have custody ... unless restricted by statutory provision or Court order or agreement 
the person entitled to custody must have reasonable freedom to select the child's place of 
residence.37 
The characterisation ofthis parental freedom as a general "right", though 
unexpected in a Family Law context, has been affirmed by other more 
recent decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal, and has as well 
been echoed in cases overseas.38 The assertion of this freedom or "right" 
can, as discussed earlier, be linked with the child's welfare, and the Full 
Court of the Family Court of Australia once expressly observed that the 
cases affirming the freedom of the custodial parent are only explicable on 
the basis that freedom of movement and the welfare of the child often 
overlap.39 Such a linkage means that a non-custodial parent seeking to 
34 The point made by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in In the marriage of Holmes 
and Holmes note 6 at 76,664. See also, for example, Dunshea v Dunshea (1987) 11 Fam LR 563, 
at 569 and Fasan v Fasan, note 13, at 132. 
3s See also the decision of the Supreme Court ofNew South Wales in Dunshea v Dunshea, ibid. But 
cf Wright v Wright, note 2: the mother and father both applied for custody, with the mother 
proposing to move from Wellington to Auckland. The Family Court awarded custody to the mother 
on condition she resided in Wellington; in the event that she wished to move, the Court decreed 
that custody should be awarded to the father; the High Court, however, allowed the appeal by the 
mother and removed the condition. 
- 
36 For example see Burke v Rahim, note 27, and P (Zw v P (GE), note 13. 
37 Note 2, at 371. 
38 See, for example, Parmenter v Butt, note 30, at 54 per Thorp J, and Staa'niczenko v Stahinenko, note 
4, and, in Australia, In the marriage ofArmstrong (1983) 9 FLR 402, at 407. In both Staa'niczenko and 
Armstrong, however, conditions as to residence were imposed on the custodial parent. 
39 In the marriage of Holmes and Holmes, note 6, at 76,664. 
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resist the planned move must establish that the interests of the custodial 
parent and child are clearly incompatible, and must adduce specific reasons 
why the child's welfare would be adversely affected by the move and new 
enviror~ment.~~ Thus, Thorp J, delivering judgment in the Family Division, 
interpreted the paramountcy principle to mean that: 
... leave should not be withheld unless the interests of the child and those of the custodial 
parent are clearly shown to be incompatible. So the approach of the Court is to sanction the 
realistic roposal of the custodial parent unless that proposal is inconsistent with the child's 
welfare. 8 
In similar vein, the Family Court of Australia recently characterised 
restrictions on the custodial movement as "serious",42 and in an earlier 
judgment held that orders restricting movement of the custodial parent 
would only be made in "exceptional  circumstance^".^^ The Ontario Court 
of Appeal also recently explained that the Courts need to recognise the 
"enormous undertaking ... and the overwhelmingly relentless nature of the 
custodial re~ponsibility".~~ When such approaches are taken, it can be seen 
that a non-custodial parent, who does not seek custody, but seeks to prevent 
the custodial parent from moving, has, as the English Court of Appeal 
suggested, a "heavy burden to di~charge".~~ 
Nevertheless, the custodial parent can also sometimes carry an eviden- 
tial burden of s0rts.4~ For instance, in a case where there had been an 
agreement covering questions of moving the child, the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal held that the custodial parent who sought to depart from the 
agreement would bear the onus of proving that his or her actions were being 
taken to advance the child's ~e l fa re .4~  The Supreme Court of New South 
Wales also once declared that the custodial parent's freedom or right to 
choose a location arose only where the Court was able to see that a child's 
lifestyle would not be upset by removal from the familiar geographical and 
social envir~nment .~~ If that approach is taken, then the custodial parent 
would, of course, have the onus of establishing that absence of upset. 
Further, Judge Boshier has held in C v C49 that a proposed move would be 
held unreasonable, and therefore not be countenanced, if "the benefits of 
new residence are not demon~trable".~~ Although the Judge did acknow- 
ledge that the weight of the case-law favoured the ability of the custodial 
parent to move, such dicta would seem to put some evidential onus on the 
custodial parent to establish those benefits. 
Finally, the custodial parent may have a heavier onus where he or she 
plans to take the child overseas. There are a number of Australian decisions 
40 The approach of the Family Court of Australia in In the Marriage ofArms&ong, note 38. See also 
the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Chamberlain v de la Mare, note 10. 
41 Re K (A Minor)(Removalfrom Jurisdiction) [I9921 2 FLR 98, at 106. 
42 In the marriage of IandI, note 10, at 82,024. 
43 In the marriage of Ryan andRyan, note 33, at 75,704 (in this case though such a restriction was 
made). 
44 MacGiver v Richards, note 19, at 18-19. 
45 Chamberlain v de la Mare, note 10, at 440 per Ormrod LJ. 
46 The point made in a leading decision of the Ontario Court of Carter v Brooks (1990) 30 RFL (3d) 
. . 
53, at 63 per Morden ACJO. 
47 Sabagh v Sabagh (1994) 2 RFL (4th) 44, at 47 per Helper JA and Scott CJM. 
4s See the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Rudolph v Dent (1985) 10 FLR 
669. 
49 [I9951 NZFLR 360. 
so Ibid, at 368. 
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drawing distinctions between applications to move interstate and applica- 
tions to move over~eas.~ '  In New Zealand, the distinction is apparent in s. 
20(3) of the Guardianship Act 1968, which applies only to removals 
overseas. The reason for the differentiation is clear: once the child is 
overseas, the domestic Court lacks any formal power to protect the child's 
welfare, and access to the non-custodial parent becomes obviously more 
difficult to arrange and implement. 
Additionally, a child moving overseas will often have to make cultural, 
social and educational adjustments over and above those demanded by a 
shift within his or her own country. It was thus contended by the Family 
Court of Australia that the broad homogeneity of society within that 
jurisdiction, coupled with a well-established pattern of substantial numbers 
of people moving between States, made it difficult to argue that the welfare 
of children would be detrimentally affected by the mere fact of the move 
within the country.52 The same is probably true of New Zealand. Where 
the move is abroad, however, the same assumption cannot be so readily 
made. Nevertheless, there is an abundance of cases within New Zealand 
and from overseas jurisdictions in which the custodial parent has been 
allowed to leave the jurisdiction. The factor of an overseas shift is certainly 
relevant, but has not proved overly powerful in militating against the 
custodial parent's proposal. 
Whether the proposed move is within or outside the domestic jurisdic- 
tion, the Court is concerned most with the bona fides and reasonableness 
of the application, and these factors, often merging one into the other, 
warrant detailed examination. 
Bona fides motive - economic enhancement 
It is now well-established that, as a prerequisite for permission to move 
to be granted, the Court must be satisfied the application to move is genuine 
and made in good faith.53 Recently, the Full Court of the Family Court of 
Australia identified three examples of a lack of bona fides. These were: 
where the dominant purpose of the application differed from that given by 
the applicant, where the real purpose of the removal was to cut off any 
meaningful contact between the children and the access parent, with the 
objective of destroying whatever relationship may have hitherto existed, 
and where the purpose was to impede or hinder access.54 If any such motive 
for the application could be established, then that would be the end of the 
application; the Court would not proceed to consider any other aspects of 
the reasonableness of the application. 
However, provided the predominant motive for the move is not the 
diminution of contact between the children and the non-custodial parent, 
then it would seem that a desire on the part of the custodial parent to put 
greater physical space between herself or himself and the non-custodial 
parent may, at least where there is a relationship of real difficulty, in certain 
circumstances be seen as "reasonable", and survive the good faith test. In 
51 See eg In the marriage of Holmes and Holmes, note 6, at 76,664, In the Marriage of Armstrong, 
note 38, at 407, and Craven v Craven (1976) at 75.204. 
5 2  In the marriage ofdrmstrong, ibid, at 407. ' 
53 See eg Blois v Blois (1988) 210 APR 328, at 332; Reeves v Reeves, note 10, at 40; P (LW v P 
(GE), note 13, at 661; Tyler v Tyler, note 12, at 162. 
54 In the marriage of Skeates-Udy (1995) FLC 92-626, at 82,285 per Baker J .  
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Parmenter v Batt Thorp J accepted that the custodial mother's planned 
move from Auckland to Waiheke Island was largely motivated by a strong 
desire to increase the physical distance between herself and her former 
husband, whom the mother saw as determined to control her own life. 
Nevertheless, his Honour felt that it would be "unreasonable" to require 
her to live in close physical proximity; and a loss of midweek access for 
the father could, in his Honour's view, be offset by increasing holiday 
access. 
The most commonly advanced motive for the application to move is the 
desire on the part of the custodial parent to enhance the educational, career, 
or economic prospects of either himself or herself, or his or her new partner. 
A number of Canadian decisions illustrate well the willingness of the 
Courts in that jurisdiction to facilitate the economic enhancement of the 
custodial parent. For instance, one custodial mother was granted permis- 
sion to leave Windsor for Ontario in order to take up a law clerk's 
position,55 and another mother was allowed to move away from Ontario, 
where the Court felt she would be caught up in an "endless cycle of conflict 
and poverty", to the rovince of British Columbia where she had been 
offered employrnent3 In a further case, where the new husband of the 
custodial mother needed to transfer from Winnipeg to Alberta in order to 
retain his job as a credit manager for a large company, the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal noted that Canadians often had to move in order to search for 
employment or to better their present employment, and that it was in the 
interests of the child for the new stepfather to have a secure income rather 
than being forced to seek new employment or receive social welfare 
as~ is tance .~~  In such cases it can be seen that the Canadian Courts generally 
have ranked the economic well-being of the custodial parent, and, where 
relevant, the new family, as a higher priority than the needs of the child for 
continuation of the existing access regime. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in a landmark judgment on spousal 
maintenance recognised the economic hardships often borne by women 
following separation as a result of their traditional child-care responsibili- 
ties, and acce ted the reality ofthe phenomenon known as the "feminisation 
of poverty".lhn an Australian case on custodial mobility, the Full Court of 
the Family Court of Australia included reference to the Supreme Court 
judgment, and endorsed the view that "economic factors and the unequal 
position of women" are relevant factors for the Courts to take into account 
in this area of law.59 This recognition of economic realities, and the increase 
of emotional well-being that normally accompanies a higher standard of 
living for both the child and the custodial parent (who is usually female), 
can also be seen in a number of cases from both New Zealand and England. 
55 Fasan v Fasan, note 13. 
56 Jarrett v Jarrett (1995) 10 RFL (4th) 24. See also for instance Oldfield v Oldfield, note 25, where 
the Court granted permission for the custodial mother to retum to France, noting, inter alia, that 
she was likely to find employment there which was more intellectually satisfying and financially 
rewarding than she was likely to find in Canada. 
57 Korpesho v Korpesho (1982) 31 RFL 449. (But cf the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Carter v Brooks, note 46, where the mother unsuccessfully sought to move from Ontario to British 
Columbia in order to enable her husband to pursue a legitimate and advantageous job opportunity.) 
58 Moge v Moge [I9921 3 SCR 813. 
59 In the marriage of I and I, note 10, at 82,028. 
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In Kennedy v Tyler,60 for example, Judge Blaikie provisionally granted 
leave for the custodial mother to leave New Zealand for Australia because 
of the claim of her new husband, who was on the unemployment benefit 
and unable to obtain suitable employment in Dunedin, that he would be 
able to set up a maintenance business in Townsville and possibly gain a 
sand-blasting job there. Stating that the difficulties arising out of unem- 
ployment could not be under-estimated, Judge Blaikie was largely per- 
suaded to grant leave (on the condition, inter alia, that the husband had first 
obtained paid employment), because "... the desire to acquire full-time 
employment must itself improve the emotional feeling of self-worth on the 
part of the mother and Mr Kennedy, and must improve in a material way 
the lifestyle available to the children them~elves."~' Similarly, one of the 
reasons which prompted Judge Boshier to allow the custodial mother to 
leave New Zealand to live in England in C v C62 was because her economic 
position in Auckland as a domestic purposes beneficiary, unlikely to find 
work, would be improved in the United Kingdom where she would have 
greatly enhanced financial resources open to her. 
In one English case, the Court of Appeal considered the desire of the 
custodial mother and her new husband to leave England to live in New 
Zealand was a reasonable one, because, in part, the husband on his salary 
in New Zealand would acquire a higher standard of living.63 In similar vein, 
the English Court of Appeal in two other cases allowed one custodial 
mother to leave England for South Africa because of the offer of a 
University teaching ap ointment, which she had been unable to obtain in 
the United Kingdom,& and another to leave for the United States of 
America because of an advantageous job offer in hotel management 
there.65 
Finally, though, it should be noted that the Full Court ofthe Family Court 
of Australia has held that where an application to leave the country was 
based on a proposal of the custodial parent to pursue an educational 
programme, the Court is entitled to be satisfied that the educational course 
proposed will have some "practical relevance to the current socio-eco- 
nomic circumstances" of the custodial parent.66 Obiter dicta, Judge Boshier 
in C v C has also observed that where there is no apparent reason for a 
move from an established residence (and the non-custodial parent has an 
important part in the child's life) then the Court "may be slow to condone 
a move away".67 These are judicial reminders that the motive of the 
applicant must not only be simply bona fides, but also be reasonably based. 
60 (1988) 4 NZFLR 708. 
6 1  Ibid, at 714. 
62 Note 49. 
63 Lonslow v Henni~.  note 10. at 380 and 382 oer Dillon LJ. 
64  Nash v Nash [197?] 2 All ER 704 (the ~ a l ~ b f f e r e d w a s  l o double what she was then receiving). 
65 Re F (a Ward) [I9881 2 FLR 116. 
66  In the marriage ofSkeales-Udy, note 54, at 82,296 (the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia 
held that the trial Judge was mistaken in holding the custodial mother's application was not bona 
fides, but that neverth-eless he had made no e r r 6  of law in finding her reason was not compelling 
enough to allow the move at the expense of the children's relationship with their father). 
67  Note 49, at 368. On the other hand, in Wright v Wright, note 2, it appearedthere was no compelling 
reason for the custodial mother's wish to move from Wellington to Auckland other than "simply 
that she would prefer to live there" (at 367). The Family COU; did make a custody order imposing 
a condition as to residence in Wellington, but this condition was removed by Grieg J in the High 
Court. 
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Reasonableness 
Whilst the motive for the custodial parent's planned move is commonly 
economic in its origin, it need not be so confined. It might arise, for 
example, in substance or in part, out of a desire to re-establish links with 
family or a familiar culture, or out of a wish to develop a relationship with 
a partner who lives elsewhere. Whatever the motivation, assuming first its 
genuineness, the Court must come to consider the reasonableness of the 
plan. In the abstract, one would expect the question of the reasonableness 
or otherwise of the move to be assessed essentially from the child's 
perspective, but with the welfare of the child being so often integrally 
linked to the welfare of the custodial parent, the Courts sometimes have to 
step out of the child's shoes and adopt a more adult-focused approach. 
Obviously reasonableness is a question of fact, embracing a multitude of 
factors,68 but a number of considerations are of particular importance and 
are discussed below. 
(i) Duration of proposed move 
In determining the reasonableness of the plan the proposed duration of 
residence in the new location can be of great imp~r tance .~~  There is, 
needless to say, a fundamental difference between a proposed overseas 
holiday and planned emigration, and normally one would expect the Court 
to be much more ready to countenance overseas vacation plans.70 In D v 
D71 Judge Pethig declared his belief that the child would benefit from 
overseas holiday travel, and from meeting overseas family, and that the 
proposed trip would be a "positive, broadening experience in all sorts of 
ways".72 His Honour was not, however, prepared to entertain a proposal 
for the child to spend 12 months overseas, and the Judge, clearly concerned 
about the effect of a long absence on both the boy's schooling and 
relationship with the non-custodial father, indicated that a period of 6 
months would be more appropriate. Similarly, in Lake v Lake73 Judge 
Maxwell was not prepared to countenance a proposal whereby the custo- 
dial mother and her de facto partner would live in Melbourne for two years. 
It can be thus be said that if the proposed period away exceeds a period of 
a few months, then the move has really ceased to have the character of a 
vacation, and the risk of potential damage to the relationship between the 
child and non-custodial parent has clearly increased. Other factors of 
reasonableness must then come into play. 
68 Ten possible major factors were identified by Judge Greene in her paper delivered at Family Law 
Conference in October 1995: note 26, at 133-134. 
69 It was the first factor, in anon-exhaustive list of relevant factors, identified as relevant by the Full 
Court of the Family Court of Australia in Kuebler v Kuebler (1978) FLC 90-433, at 77,205. 
70 See eg N v N FLN-63(2d), note 90, where the custodial mother was authorised to take the child 
overseas for an eight week holiday with herself and her partner. See further Buckle v Buckle (Family 
Court, Palmerston North, FP 054/331/94, 28 June 1995) where Judge von Dadelszen authorised 
the grandparents to take their grandchildren on a 4 week trip to the United States of America, 
during which time the grandmother was to receive a rare University award. Nevertheless, even 
where the nature of the trip overseas is clearly of a holiday nature, being of very short duration, 
the proposal might be rejected as unreasonable if it breaches some previously made agreement by 
the parties: Sabagh v Sabagh, note 47. 
71 (1984) 1 FRNZ 181. 
72 Ibid, at 182. 
73 FLN-5(2d) N6. 
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(ii) Cultural and social considerations 
Where the proposal for overseas residence does involves a more permanent 
shift, then cultural considerations often become relevant. Those considera- 
tions are of reduced significance if the cultural milieu in the new country is 
not too dissimilar from the old (as where, for example, a European New 
Zealand family moves to Australia), but where there are pronounced cultural 
or racial differences in the new country then, as pointed out by the Australian 
Family Court, these can be of some ~ignificance.~~ For instance, in Greer v 
Greer,75 the New Zealand Family Court, declining an application of the 
custodial mother to leave New Zealand for Israel, commented on the benefits 
of continuity of language, lifestyle and culture for a ten-year-old boy. In P v 
P7'j the Family Court, declining an application for the child to return to Western 
Samoa, emphasised that where there was a choice of two cultures, the decision 
must ultimately be one that is "best designed to permit each culture to develop 
in tandem".77 On the other hand, if the child is a member of a minority racial 
group in his or her present country then, as in Burke v R~him,7~ it may be 
positively advantageous for a child to move to a new country where the racial 
differences are not so significant. 
Sometimes a custodial parent who is not presentlyresiding in the country 
regarded as "home" may have a particularly strong yearning to return to 
his or her homeland and familiar culture. An application to return home 
has a particularly high likelihood of being assessed as a reasonable one, 
especially if, as in McDowall v M c D ~ w a l l , ~ ~  the custodial parent has been 
living in the present country for only a short period of time. In one Canadian 
case, for instance, the custodial mother, a native of France, was said to have 
an attachment to France that was "an essential part of her character", and 
her return was permitted.80 Similarly, in an Australian case, the desire of 
the custodial father to live in Israel was accepted as "long-standin 
fervently held, and genuine", and the Court granted leave to return. 8 
However, it must be said that in both the aforementioned cases the cultural 
adjustments required of the children were not great: in the Canadian 
decision, the children, though enjoying their English heritage, were bilin- 
gual and also enjoyed France; and in the Australian decision the boy's 
upbringing in an Orthodox Jewish home and at a Jewish school in Australia 
was stated to be not markedly different from life in Israel. As well, in both 
cases, the custodial parents were returning to families, with the children 
thereby benefiting from the presence of an extended family. 
In considering the reasonableness of any proposed move to an overseas 
country the social and legal characteristics of the new country can be 
influential. Delivering his judgment in Burke v Rahim, McGechan J argued 
7 4  In the marriage of R and R (1984) FLC 91-571 at 79,617 (an application to live in France was 
refused). 
75 [I9951 NZFLR 176, at 181 per Judge Strettell. 
76 (Family Court, PalmerstonNorth FP 85/14/89), as quoted by Judge Strettell in Greer v Greer, note 
32, at 183. In Greer 's case the application by the custodial mother to return to Israel to live was 
refused. 
77 Ibid. 
78 (High Court, Wellington, AP 302 and 330/92,25 May 1993) at 24-25 per McGechan J. 
79 [I9951 NZFLR 163 (the parties were South African and had lived inNew Zealand for only 8 months 
- the mother was permitted to return to South Africa). 
80 Oldfieldv Oldfield (1991) 33 RFL (3d) 235, at 251 per Blair J. 
81 In the marriage of Lourie and Perlstein, note 23. 
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that sometimes the Court must attempt to evaluate the suitability or 
otherwise of a foreign society for the up-bringing of children in accordance 
with "some basic norms and requirements of civilised behavi~ur".~~ On 
the facts of this case, his Honour said that whilst there would be reluctance 
to release a child into some primitive society, or a society which shows 
"abhorrent features" the Court did not regard Singapore, with its arguably 
less liberal structure, as being an unsuitable place for the children to grow 
up, and the mother was allowed to take the children there. 
On this matter of the social conditions and structures in the proposed 
new country, an English Court, granting leave for the custodial mother and 
stepfather to leave England ratifyingly described life in New Zealand as 
a "reasonable way of life"F3 and in another case Winn LJ, delivering 
judgment in 1970, described New Zealand as a "highly civilised country", 
stating that "one need not worry too much about the protection of the child 
if trouble arose".84 Perhaps more surprisingly, though, the English Court 
of Appeal, allowing the custodial mother to move to South Afi-ica, de- 
scribed South Africa in 1973 as being, apart from the apartheid objection, 
"an ordinary civilised place".85 
In assessing whether or not the country can be deemed "civilised" the 
procedures and principles upon which the legal system deals with issues 
of guardianship, custody and access are important.86 For example, the 
Family Court of Australia, in granting leave for a custodial father to 
emigrate to Israel, emphasised that Israel was a "civilised country", with 
the Courts operating upon the paramountcy principle.87 Judicial concern 
over the nature of the Family Law system in the intended new State 
emanates from the lack of enforceability of a domestic Court order in 
overseas jurisdictions. In Burke v Rahim, the High Court explicitly recog- 
nised that conditions made by the Family Court as to access to the children 
in Singapore could well prove idle, unenforceable, and empty in that 
country, and McGechan J warned that in the eventuality that the access 
arrangements did not work as contemplated the High Court would probably 
be required to delete provision as to access. 
On the other hand, the New Zealand Family Court, referring to the 
comity between the Family Courts in Australia and New Zealand, has 
suggested that if the New Zealand Family Court were to make an order of 
access in favour of the non-custodial parent then that order, whilst not 
actually enforceable in Australia, might, if not complied with by the 
custodial parent, be seen as the appropriate basis for a similar order to be 
made by the Australian Family However, any suggestion that a 
domestic Court could make an order allowing relocation on the condition 
that the appropriate overseas Court had first made an access order in favour 
of the non-custodial parent could rightly be dismissed as fanciful and "a 
total ~nrea l i ty" .~~  Generally, the domestic courts simply accept that if the 
82 Note 78, at 24. 
83 Lonslow v Hennig, note 10, at 382per DillonJ, citing the unchallengedfindings of the High Court 
Judge. 
84 P (Lq v P (GE), note 13, at 662. 
8s Nash v Nash, note 64, at 708 per Davies LJ. 
86 See the comment by the Family Court of Australia in In the marriage ofR andR, note 73, at 79,617. 
87 In the marriage of Lourie and Perlstein, note 23. 
88 Reeves v Reeves, note 10, at 43 per Judge Kean. 
89 Tyler v Tyler, note 12, at 165 per Ken LJ. 
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custodial parent's application to leave for an overseas destination is to be 
granted then the welfare of the children will lie exclusively in the hands of 
that country's legal system. Consequently, judicial assessments of whether 
or not a new country's legal and social systems are based on "civilised" 
norms and the paramountcy principle, although implicitly paternalistic, are 
frequently to be found. 
As an aspect of the social structure of the proposed new country, the 
available medical and educational facilities available for the children must 
affect the children's welfare, and thereby the reasonableness of the appli- 
cation. Thus, Ormrod LJ, though embracing the general principle of 
custodial parent freedom, gave as an example of incompatibility between 
the interests of the children and the custodial parent the case of where a 
child was well-settled in a boarding school, so that it would be very 
disadvantageous to "upset the situation and move the child into a very 
different educational system".g0 Sometimes, of course, the educational or 
medical facilities available in the new country might prove to be superior 
to those in the child's present home, and in that type of case the proposal 
to move more will more obviously appear rea~onable.~' 
(iii) Relationship with extended family and non-custodialparent 
Often the motive for the planned move to a new location is the custodial 
parent's need to receive the support and love of family and friends based 
at that place. For instance in Bachler v Parkerg2 the specialist reporter 
highlighted the need for the custodial mother, who had only recently been 
reunited with her birth father in Australia, to care for her four-year-old 
child within the context of a caring extended family. Judge Frater felt that 
the mother, who had experienced a troubled past, needed to develop 
relationships with her father and other members of her Australian family, 
and the Judge therefore allowed her to leave. 
Sometimes, though, a proposed shift overseas is determined to be 
detrimental to the child's welfare, because, from the child's perspective, 
/the inevitable loss of regular contact with the non-custodial parent is 
compounded by the loss of contact with the extended family or friends of 
the home environment. In cases from both New Zealand and Australia such 
a loss has been influential in disallowing the proposed overseas move.93 In 
some Canadian cases the loss of relatives and friends has even been 
influential in the Court's refusal to allow the custodial parent to move 
between provinces. For instance, the Prince Edward Supreme Court re- 
fused to allow the custodial mother to take her three-year-old girl to 
Ottawa, declaring that the relationships of a little girl with her grandparents 
and friends were, together with her relationship with the non-custodial 
parent, important to her and should not be lost.94 Likewise, in a case where 
90 This passage from the unreported judgment of Moodey v Field (decided 13 February 1981) was 
quoted by Dillon LJ in Lonslow v Hennig, su ra, note 10, at 382. 
91 See eg McDowaN v McDowall, note 79 (he child suffered from the serious condition of 
neutropenia; the medical resources for treatment in New Zealand, whilst adequate, were found by 
Judge O'Donovan to be in some ways inferior to those available in South Africa). In In the marriage 
of Lourie and Peristein, note 23, Treyvaud J noted the suggestion that the Jewish school system 
in Israel was preferable to the Jewish school system in Australia (at 80,154). 
92 Note 17. 
93 See eg Greer v Greer, note 32, and Dunshea v Dunshea, note 34, at 567 (SC NSW) per Bryson J. 
94 Crawfordv Crawford (1985) 46 RFL (2d) 331, at 336 per Mullally J. 
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a four-year-old son had the benefit of very extensive and warm extended 
family in Ontario, the Ontario Family Court refused the custodial parent's 
application to move to Ottawa: it was held that maintenance of these 
relationships, and the associated Italian cultural traditions, were important 
for the boy.95 
On occasion, there is no such loss to take into account. Most particularly, 
where the extended family, or in greater likelihood the non-custodial 
parent, has a negative influence on the child, then a proposed move will 
inevitably appear more reasonable. For instance, if there has been inter- 
parental conflict, then a greater geographical distance may allow the 
animosity to subside.96 In Thomson v T h o m ~ o n ~ ~  the crucial factor in Fraser 
J's decision to allow the custodial mother to move from Dunedin to 
Australia was the continuing hostility and distrust shown by the father 
towards the mother. In the Judge's view, this antagonism was having a 
corrosive influence on the five-year-old child's welfare, and his Honour 
considered that the boy's best interests would be served by permitting the 
mother to reside in Australia, with adequate access to be reserved for the 
father. The Australian Family Court similarly held that in a case where a 
father, because of his obsessive attitude to the custodial mother, seemed 
unable to cater for his children's emotional needs, and the trial judge had 
been unable to dismiss the possibility of the father behaving in a sexually 
inappropriate behaviour towards the children, it would be unreasonable to 
require the mother to stay in A u ~ t r a l i a . ~ ~  
(iv) Finances 
The reasonableness of the custodial parent's move can be affected by 
the financial means of the non-custodial parent. For instance, in C v C Judge 
Boshier, approving the custodial mother's plan to live in England, noted 
that the father, with the mother's assistance, had the financial means to 
visit the United Kingdom at reasonably regular intervals in the future.99 In 
Canadian cases, the availability of financial resources for access visits has 
also been persuasive in allowing the proposed move;loO and equally it has 
been suggested that the Canadian courts are more likely to restrict mobility 
if the access parent does not have enough money to maintain regular and 
frequent contact.lo1 
It will shortly be seen that the custodial applicant is often required to 
contribute to the costs of access where the move involves a change of 
location within the domestic jurisdiction, and is also frequently required 
to lodge a bond to help defray the access costs where the move is overseas. 
Where, however, the applicant's finances would essentially be exhausted 
in order to pay for the travel to an overseas destination this might well 
95 Brigante v Brigante, note 15, at 310 per Beckett UFCJ. 
96 See Fasan v Fasan, note 13, at 133. 
97 (High Court, Dunedin, AP 3/92,21 September 1992). 
9s In the marriage of I and I, note 10. 
99 Note 49. The mother, however, was required to contribute to his accommodation and travel in the 
UK by posting $20,000 in a separate New Zealand bank account which was to be drawn from for 
access costs. 
loo Fasan v Fasan, note 13. 
lo1 In In the marriage of I andI, note 10, the Full Court quoted Canadian comment to this effect, and 
which had cited Brigante v Brigante, note 15. See further Carter v Brooks, note 46. 
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influence a Court against allowing the move:lo2 the depletion of limited 
finances might be seen as adverse to the child's welfare. 
The position of the access parent 
From the child's point ofview, regular access is often said to be essential 
for the child's optimum emotional development. Moreover, from the 
parents' perspective, it is clear law in New Zealand that both married 
couples and de facto couples living together at the time of birth, retain 
guardianship upon separation.lo3 Accordingly, both the custodial parent 
and access parent remain, at least in theory, jointly responsible for the 
child's upbringing. A non-custodial parent could then proceed to argue that 
this responsibility or obligation is very difficult to discharge without freely 
available access, and that a change of the child's residence, inevitably 
rendering access less full and frequent, would militate against the proper 
discharge of guardianship rights or responsibilities. 
At first sight, it does seem unfair that both the access parent and the child 
are deprived of a beneficial relationship, and the Courts do frequently 
express sympathy for the predicament of the non-custodial parent when 
the children move to a new home.lo4 Nevertheless, McGechan J has 
observed that any decision based on the paramountcy principle may 
necessarily be "cruel to a parent".'05 Usually that parent will be the 
non-custodial one. In balancing losses to the child, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal has forcefully contended that the benefits to the child offered by 
the custodial parent, providing day by day care, far outweigh the benefits 
of weekend access. As a result, the Ontario Court of Appeal declared that 
the right of access, whilst important and beneficial, should not receive the 
same protection as custody rights. Moreover, when the specific issue of 
fairness between the parents is examined, there is strength in the Ontario 
Court's further argument that access parents enjoy the freedom to live as 
they wish, at least when the children are not present on visits, whereas the 
custodial parents are likely to find most of their decisions and choices 
tightly restricted by their custodial role. Consistent with this line of 
thought, it has been suggested by a New Zealand psychologist, that it is 
more usual for the non-custodial parent to shift after a dissolution of 
marriage - but that such moves b non-custodial parents are rarely, if V ever, debated in the Family Court.1° Clearly, then, the access parent does 
enjoy lifestyle benefits not available to the custodial parent, and unfairness 
to the custodial parent would ensue if the access parent were able to tie the 
custodial parent to a particular locality, when, at the same time, the 
custodial parent remained entirely powerless to prevent the access parent 
moving at whim from one location to another. 
For these sorts of reasons, the Courts lack any enthusiasm to control the 
custodial parent's freedom, and prefer instead to restructure access ar- 
rangements. As an indication of a general judicial approach, the Family 
Court of Australia once declared that a custodial parent's freedom of 
102 See, for example, Lake v Lake FLN-5(2d) N6-7. 
103 Section 6(1) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
104 See eg the English Court of Appeal decisions of P (LM) v P (GE), note 13, and Lonslow v Hennig, 
notelo. 
10s Burke v Rahirn, note 27, at 16. 
106 Adamiak, "Wait Until Your Father Gets Home" - Reflections of a s 29A Reporter" in Family 
Law Conference Papers Vol 1 ,  note 26, at 119. 
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mobility should only be restricted if "... the welfare of the children clearly 
indicates that the other parent should have regular weekly access rather 
than less frequent but longer periods of access."107 
When deciding on restructured access, though, the Court needs to 
concern itself with such practicalities as the ability of the non-custodial 
parent to visit during the child's scheduled school holidays. On occasions, 
practical difficulties ofthis nature may tell against the viability,ofthe move 
proposed by the custodial parent.lo8 The Supreme Court~of New South 
Wales in one case found that a proposed annual visit of several weeks from 
two sons aged 8 and 12 to their non-custodial father would result in the 
paternal relationship becoming fairly nominal during the rest of the year, 
with an ensuing injury40 that relationship resulting in a "large injury" to 
%the boys' welfare: the mother's application to move to Tasmania was 
accordingly ,declined. lo9 
In considering restructured aocess in the aftermath of a move, and the 
consequent~effect an the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent, 
the child's age can be a pertinent consideration; and, as Judge Greene 
asserted in her recent conference paper, the Court must determine such 
matters as whether written or telephone communication would be a real- 
istic prospect for the children and parent.lI0 Commenting on Bachler v 
Parker1" the Judge also noted how the Court could take "an intermediate 
step" of requiring the custodial parent to stay in New Zealand "for 
sufficient time for the child to be prepared for a planned and properly 
ordered departure" and until the child was of an age "where he was able 
to hold his father in his memory during his absence overseas".112 
As in Bachler 's case, the Court might also authorise counselling for the 
parties in order to help both parents come to terms with their future 
responsibilities for the child's welfare. By whatever method, the Court will 
invariably seek to avoid a complete termination and loss of relationship 
with the non-custodial parent. Conventional wisdom does prescribe that, 
other than in rare circumstances, some of the most vital factors for the 
psychological well-being of children during their childhood, and indeed 
during adulthood, are the opportunity to have a relationship with both 
parents and the knowledge that they are loved by both.l13 The Courts will 
therefore do their utmost to ensure that some access is continued. 
Ensuring continuation of access 
As earlier discussed, an order of a domestic Court is generally unen- 
forceable in an overseas jurisdiction, and where there is a proposal to move 
overseas, much therefore depends on the willingness ofthe custodial parent 
to facilitate any access that is either suggested or ordered by the domestic 
Court. Accordingly, if the Court cannot be satisfied that the custodial 
107 Craven v Craven, note 51, at 75,205. 
108 See, for example, Rudolph v Dent, note 48, at 678. 
109 Dunshea v Dunshea, note 34, at 568 per Bryson J. 
I lo Note 26, at 134. In Lonslow v Hennig, note 10, Dillon LJ contemplated that between the envisaged 
visits every two years, contact between the father and the two daughters aged 10 and 12 would be 
kept alive by letters, photographs, and telephone calls and by the father's receipt of school reports. 
111 Note 17. 
112 Note 26, at 136. 
I 13 Judge Eberhard described this as his "considered and passionate belief' in Jarrett v Jarrett (1995) 
10 RFL (4th) 24, at 29. See also the much cited work of Wallerstein and her co-authors in Surviving 
the Breakup (Basic Books, 1980), and Second Chances, note 1. 
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parent would comply with any orders for restructured access, this can prove 
to be "a wei hty, although not decisive matter" against the success of the 
application.' Similarly, if an application is made to move overseas for a 
period of limited duration, and then return, the Court may need to be 
satisfied that an undertaking to return will be satisfied.l15 
In order to reinforce access orders or undertakings the custodial parent 
may be required to pay a bond, or, as McGechan J preferred to describe it, 
an "indemnity or guarantee".l16 For instance in D v D where Judge Pethig 
authorised the custodial mother to take her son to Australia for six months, 
the mother was required to post a bond of $10,000; and in Burke v Rahim 
McGechan J made his a ~ ~ r o v a l  for the custodial mother to leave for 
Singapore conditional on' 'her father posting a bond, or indemnity, of 
$so,ooo. 
In Burke 's case the sum also served as a fund to help defray access costs 
of the non-custodial parent, and there are a number of New Zealand case 
examples where the successful custodial parent has been required to lod e 
a sum in a bank or trust account in order to assist with future access costs. W 7 
Furthermore, the costs normally incumbent on an access parent can be 
lessened if the custodial parent agrees either not to apply for a child support 
formula assessment, or that any sums previously paid for child support be 
instead paid into an account for the purpose of funding access.118 With such 
arrangements, though, it is important for the access parent to appreciate 
that the custodial parent could withdraw from that agreement at any time,' l9 
and the non-custodial parent does remain potentially liable for Child 
Support payments, irrespective of the place or country of the child's 
residence.120 
Conclusion 
The case-law shows it is rare for a custodial parent to be refused 
permission to move, assuming that his or her motive for the move is a bona 
fides one; and the child's welfare, which is by no means invariably the 
pivot of the various judgments, is usually assumed to be best promoted by 
promotion of the custodial parent's economic and psychological welfare. 
I 14 Holmes v Holmes, note 6, at 76,663. 
I IS See eg In the marriage of Kuebler and Kuebler (1978) FLC 90-434,77,206 per Asche SJ. On the 
other hand, the English Court ofAppeal allowed the custodial mother to move in Lonslow v Hennig, 
note 10, where the access proposal was for an eight week visit every two years. 
I 16 Burke v Rahim, note 78, at 35. 
I 17 See, for instance, C v C, note 49 (the custodial parent was to deposit $20,000 in a separate New 
Zealand bank account, to be managed jointly, from which $3,000 was to be withdrawn for access 
visits to England); Kennedy and Tyler, note 60 ($5,000 was to be lodged in a trust account of 
Counsel for the Child, who was permitted to invest in an authorised trustee investment, and annual 
interest was to be used for the costs of return air fares for both children between Australia and New 
Zealand in accordance with the ordered access arrangements); and in Bachler v Parker, note 17, 
it was ordered that, if the non-custodial parent did not himself move to Australia prior to the 
custodial parent and child, then the custodial parent was not to leave New Zealand until, inter alia, 
funds were lodged in the trust account of Counsel for the Child to cover the costs of the first access 
visit. 
I 1 8  Judge Greene notes in her paper that the parties may agree to contract out ofthe Child Support Act 
regime in order that child support be instead put towards travel costs: note 26, at 137. In Kennedy 
v Tyler, note 60, the sum of $18.00 per week previously paid for child maintenance was ordered 
to be paid into the trust account of Counsel for the Child in order to help fund air fares and access 
costs. (For similar arrangements see the leading English case P (LM) v P (GE), note 13.) 
119 See s. 65 of the Child Support Act 1991. 
120 See the failure of the non-custodial parent to obtain a departure order in Lyon v Wilcox [I9941 
NZFLR 653 (CA). 
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Normally, though, the move will in fact have some detrimental conse- 
quences for the child, and is likely to result in a more distant relationship 
with the non-custodial parent. However, that diminished relationship with 
the access parent is perceived to pose less of a risk to the child's welfare 
than the diminished and impaired parenting from a custodial parent who 
feels thwarted, frustrated and embittered by an adverse judicial decision. 
Essentially, then, the case-law seems to establish that custody carries 
with it not only the rights and responsibility of possession and care of the 
child, but also the right to determine the geographical location in which 
those rights and responsibilities will be carried out. The access parent 
might well feel that his or her parenting role is effectively being disre- 
garded when a move is approved by the Court, but, as the Ontario Court 
of Appeal contended, it can be "manifestly unfair" to treat the interests of 
the access parent and custodial parent as being on an equal footing.121 
Nevertheless, in exceptional cases the Courts will rule against the 
custodial parent and constrict his or her freedom to move. Examples of 
such rulings include cases where custody is being disputed and both parties 
would be suitable custodial a r e n t ~ , ' ~ ~  where the custodial parent's new 
relationship seems unstable,'P3 where the custodial parent's plan is simply 
impractical and i l l -c~nceived,~~~ where the custodial parent could cope 
with a decision refusing permission to move,125 where the child is of a 
young age that would make loss of grandparents, friends, and access parent 
particularly difficult,126 and where the child has special needs.'27 
Generally, though, in this area of law the custodial parent's freedom to 
move is accorded primary importance and weight by the Courts, and 
generally, it must be said, the wish of the custodial parent has become the 
first and paramount consideration 
121 MacGiver v Richards, note 19, at 24. 
122 DumheavDunshea, note 34. To some extent, this was also the case inStadninenko ~Stadniczenko, 
note 4. 
123 Brigante v Brigante, note 15 (the child also enjoyed a close relationship with the access parent and 
his extended family). 
124 Re K, note 41. 
125 Re Tyler, note 12. 
126 See Greer v Greer. note 32. and Crawford v Crawford. note 93. In Stadniczenko v Stadniczenko, 
note 4, the trauma of change for children aged 7 anh 5 was influential in the High Court's decision 
to refuse permission (at 501). 
127 In the Marriage ofdmsfrong, note 38, (the child was "mentally retarded"). 
